1 Second, we compare the divisible goods and indivisible money model of Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995) , the same model with lotteries on money, and the divisible money and divisible goods model of Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 . Introducing lotteries on money, like the study of divisible money, will be useful for identifying the origin of the ine!ciencies that arise in indivisible money models.
Our framework potentially generates three types of ine!ciencies that can arise simultaneously. First, there is what we call a no-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings there is no production and consumption even though trading would be e!cient. Second, there is a too-much-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings the quantities produced and exchanged are larger than what the solution to a social planner's problem would dictate. Third, there is a too-little-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings production is too small relative to the planner's solution.
The following results emerge from the analysis. First, the no-trade and the too-muchtrade ine!ciencies are caused by the indivisibility of money. They are present neither in the divisible money model nor in indivisible money models when lotteries are allowed. Second, the too-little-trade ine!ciency appears in all models. This ine!ciency is due to the impatience of the traders and the time-consuming nature of the exchange process. Third, the set of meetings where the quantities traded are ine!ciently low is smaller, and the purchasing power of money larger, when money is divisible. Fourth, the bargaining procedure, particularly the bargaining power of buyers and sellers, plays a much less important role than we expected. In fact, we !nd that the results stated above do not depend on the bargaining power of the buyers.
We also show how the divisibility of money a"ects the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set in a match between a buyer and a seller. The bargaining set of the bargaining game with divisible money (or with indivisible money and lotteries) always contains the bargaining set of the game with indivisible money. The reason for this result is that indivisible money, in contrast to divisible money (or lotteries), transfers utility imperfectly. Intuitively, when money is perfectly divisible, the buyer makes a monetary transfer to compensate the seller for his production cost. Because money is equally valued by the buyer and the seller, money is a perfect means to transfer utility. When money is indivisible, however, the seller adjusts the quantity he produces to compensate the buyer for the indivisible unit of money. In contrast to a transfer of divisible money, real production is an ine!cient means to transfer utility, because of the decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Graphically, the fact that indivisible money, we will only consider lotteries on money. This restriction allows us to focus on the implications of indivisible money, because it introduces a notion of divisible money without a"ecting the indivisibility of goods. 2 divisible money (or indivisible money with lotteries) transfers utility perfectly is illustrated by a Pareto frontier which is partially linear with divisible money (or with indivisible money and lotteries) and strictly concave with indivisible money without lotteries.
Our framework makes the divisibility of money visible. In our divisible money model, we !nd a threshold ! ! such that in a single-coincidence meeting if a buyer's valuation for the seller's good is below ! !, he only spends a fraction of his money holdings, and if his valuation is above, he spends his entire money holdings. Moreover, if ! ! ! !, a socially e!cient quantity of the good is produced and exchanged, and if ! " ! !, an ine!ciently small quantity is traded.
In contrast, in Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 divisible money model, buyers in each meeting spend their entire money holdings, and they always receive ine!ciently small quantities of goods in exchange. 4 Interestingly, we !nd that the model with indivisible money, divisible goods, and lotteries and the divisible money model yield very similar results, because in the lottery model there is also a threshold ! ! that has the same properties as above.
We also show that the indivisibility of money can generate a welfare-improving role for in"ation. In the indivisible goods and indivisible money model, in"ation has a positive e"ect on welfare, because in"ation induces agents to spend their indivisible units of money more quickly. This e"ect is also present in the divisible goods and indivisible money model. In this model, however, an increase in the growth rate of the money supply has also an intensive e"ect by reducing the quantities of goods traded in each match. In the divisible money model or the indivisible money model with lotteries, in"ation always reduces welfare.
Our paper is related to search models of money that study the role of the divisibility assumption in monetary exchange. Taber and Wallace (1999) consider the divisibility of money in the setups due to Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) by relaxing the restrictions on agents' money holdings. Money is said to be twice as divisible if both the upper bound on money holdings and the total number of money units are doubled. The paper is also related to all search models of money that discuss the e!ciency of monetary exchange at some point. As far as we know, however, our paper is the !rst one that makes a comparison across the di"erent types of models. Finally, Jafarey and Masters (2000) study a random-matching model of indivisible money where agents have idiosyncratic preferences for each others' goods. They !nd similar ine!ciencies to ours. However, they concentrate on di"erent issues from the ones we treat.
Section 2 presents the assumptions shared by the di"erent models used in this paper.
Section 3 introduces the mismatch problem into the indivisible money models. Section 4 studies the divisible goods and divisible money model, Section 5 shows how the divisibility of money a"ects the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set, and Section 6 concludes.
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The economy consists of a continuum of in!nitly lived households of measure one, denoted by C, that specialize in consumption and production. There are " " ! types of goods and " types of households. Households are uniformly distributed among types, so that the measure of households of some given type # is $ # ! !
. For each type of good, there is a continuum of varieties represented by a circle of circumference 2 denoted by C " . Household % $ C "
produces the variety % of type #, and it derives utility from consuming all varieties of type # " 1 (mod "). Because each household can be identi!ed by the good it produces, we have
Denote by & the set of feasible quantities that a household can produce. We will consider two cases: the indivisible goods model, where & $ $0' 1%, and the divisible goods model, where
The mismatch problem is similar to that of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991) . The most preferred variety of household % $ C " is % " chosen at random on C ""! (mod "). If we draw at random a variety ( from C ""! , the length ) of the arc between % " and ( is uniformly distributed on &0' 1'. Accordingly, if household % consumes only varieties within distance ) of its most preferred variety % " , the probability that a randomly chosen variety will be consumed by the household is ).
The function mapping the distance between the variety that is consumed and the most preferred variety, ), and the quantity consumed, *, into utility is continuous in both arguments, strictly decreasing in ), and increasing in *. We adopt the following function:
where ! is strictly decreasing and twice di"erentiable, and satis!es ! (0) $ ! sup and ! (1) $ 0.
Furthermore, we assume that + is increasing and twice di"erentiable, and satis!es + (0) $ 0, + (1) $ , , + 00 ! 0, and + 0 (0) $ %. The probability that ! is less than -$ &0' ! sup ' for a variety chosen at random is equal to
where . (/) is a cumulative distribution with density 0 . Note that our assumptions on preferences and production rule out barter trades. 5 Note that the analysis would hold for any utility function satisfying
!, and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2000) we study a related environment where in each meeting there is a double coincidence of real wants.
4
A producer receives disutility 1 (*) from producing * units of a good. For the divisible goods model, we will assume that 1 (*) $ *. For the indivisible goods model, let 1 (1) $ 2 with 2 ! ! sup ,. Goods cannot be stored, and production is instantaneous. Finally, the discount factor is " $ ! !"% with 3 4 0.
In addition to the consumption goods described above there is an intrinsically worthless, storable object called !at money. We will again consider two cases: the indivisible money model, where each household consists of one individual, and the divisible money model, where each household consists of a continuum of members. For the indivisible money model, a fraction 5 $ (0' 1) of all agents are initially endowed with one unit of money and each agent has a single unit storage capacity. For the divisible money model, each household is initially endowed with 6 units of divisible money and the household evenly distributes this amount among a fraction 5 of its members. In both models, therefore, the fraction of agents in the market endowed with money is exogenous and equal to 5, and the fraction of agents without money is 1 ' 5. We call agents with money buyers, and agents without sellers. A buyer attempts to exchange money for consumption goods, and a seller attempts to produce goods for money.
Buyers and sellers meet pairwise and at random. Our assumptions about technology and preferences rule out meetings with double coincidence of real wants. Moreover, buyers only buy varieties that lie in the set 7 ( &0' ! sup ', which is determined endogenously. Consequently, for a buyer of type # who is matched to a seller, the probability of a successful trade
is the probability that the seller is of type # " 1, and
is the probability that he produces a variety in 7.
Throughout the paper we assume that in a match the buyer makes a take-it-or-leaveit o"er and the seller accepts the o"er if made no worse o" by accepting. We adopt this simplifying assumption because in Appendix B we show that our results also hold when the terms of trade are determined through general Nash bargaining.
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The aim of this section is to identify the ine!ciencies that are present in indivisible money models. For this purpose we introduce the same mismatch problem in the indivisible money and indivisible goods model of Wright (1991, 1993) and the indivisible money and divisible goods model of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) . We will also study the outcome in these models when agents are allowed to use lotteries on money to determine the terms of trades. Like the study of the divisible money model in Section 4, analyzing lotteries on money will be useful for identifying the origin of the ine!ciencies in search models of 5 money.
391 <"=(5(6(78% 0**=6 3(#$*># 8*##%r(%6 Time is continuous, agents cannot hold more than one object at a time, and the terms of trades are exogenous: one unit of money buys one indivisible commodity. Only individuals without money (sellers) are willing to produce. 7 Buyers and sellers meet randomly according to a Poisson process with arrival rate normalized to one. Thus, the probability per unit time that a buyer of type # meets a seller of type # " 1 is $ (1 ' 5), and the probability per unit time that a seller of type # meets a buyer of type # ' 1 is $5.
To introduce a notion of in"ation, we assume that a buyer's indivisible unit of money is con!scated at rate µ, and that sellers receive one unit of money at rate # $
quently, the quantity of money is constant and equal to 5. The value function of buyers satis!es the following Bellman equation:
The "ow return to a buyer, 3: ) , equals the sum of two terms. The !rst term is the rate at which the buyer meets appropriate sellers, $ (1 ' 5), times the expected gain of a match, which equals
. In a single-coincidence meeting, either the buyer spends his unit of money, which yields !, " : * ' : ) , or he remains a buyer, which yields no surplus. The second term is the rate at which a buyer's money is con!scated, µ, times the con!scation loss, : ) ' : * .
Because a buyer's utility is increasing in !, the set of acceptable varieties is
where ! is a reservation value for the taste index that satis!es
If ! " !, the buyer is willing to buy the variety. Denote by ; the reservation value for the average buyer. The probability that a variety of good # " 1 is accepted by a buyer of type # chosen at random is 1 ' . (;). Accordingly, the value functions of sellers satisfy the following Bellman equation:
The "ow return to a seller, 3: * , equals the sum of two terms. The !rst term is the rate at which the seller of type # meets a buyer of type # ' 1, $5, times the probability that the buyer accepts the trade, 1 ' . (;), times the expected gain from trading, producing, and becoming a buyer, '2 " : ) ' : * . The second term is the rate at which the seller receives a unit of money, #, times the gain of becoming a buyer, : ) ' : * .
Existence of a monetary equilibrium requires that sellers be willing to produce for money:
In the following we only consider symmetric Nash equilibria, where ! $ ;.
4%!"(#(*" 1 5or the indivisible goods and indivisible money model7 a monetary equilibrium is a triplet (: ) ' : * ' !) that satis!es equations 91;<93; and participation constraint 94;.
To compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with the allocation that a planner would choose in order to maximize welfare, consider the following ex ante Pareto criterion:
Welfare is the expected permanent income of a single agent before money is distributed. Equations (1) and (3) yield
Welfare is maximized at ! " $ 2=, . The key result is that the frequency of trades is generically too low (! 4 2=,). If One can remove the no-trade ine!ciency by choosing a su!ciently high in"ation rate.
In Appendix A1 we show that a higher in"ation rate reduces the reservation value, because waiting for a better trading opportunity becomes more costly. This is the "hot potato"
e"ect of in"ation mentioned by Li (1995) . The welfare-maximizing in"ation is the value of µ satisfying ! $ 2=,: it is the maximum level that does not destroy the monetary equilibrium.
Finally, as shown in the Appendix, equations (1), (2) 392 <"=(5(6(78% 0**=6 3(#$ 8*##%r(%6 *" A*"%)
We now allow agents to use lotteries on money to determine the terms of trade. 9 Bargaining over lotteries on money means bargaining over the probability $ ! that the unit of money changes hands. We again restrict our attention to take-it-or-leave-it o"ers (for the generalized Nash solution, see Appendix B1). With lotteries on money, the value functions of buyers and sellers satisfy the following generalized versions of (1) and (3):
3:
When a buyer meets an appropriate seller, the buyer receives the good and delivers his unit of money with probability $ ! . Thus, his expected surplus from the trade is !, ' $ ! (: ) ' : * ).
Because buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o"ers, we have '2 " $ ! (: ) ' : * ) $ 0 for all !.
Consequently, the probability that money changes hands is constant and equal to
Existence of a monetary equilibrium requires that $ be not larger than one, i.e., that the seller's participation constraint (4) be satis!ed. Because a buyer's surplus is increasing in !, buyers trade if and only if ! " !, where ! is a reservation value that satis!es .
The probability that the unit of money changes hands is
The key result is that the monetary equilibrium is e!cient, because whenever there is a positive surplus in a match, the buyer proposes an o"er that exploits the entire surplus and this o"er is not refused by the seller. 10 Accordingly, the frequency of trades is at its e!cient level, i.e., ! $ 393 4(5(6(78% 0**=6 3(#$*># 8*##%r(%6
In this subsection we explore how the mismatch problem a"ects the outcome when the terms of trade are endogenized along the lines of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) .
Suppose, therefore, that goods are divisible but money is still indivisible, and that buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it o"er to the seller about the quantity that the seller has to produce for one unit of money. Let * ! be the amount produced by a seller in exchange for one unit of money when the buyer's valuation for the good is !+(* ! ). Expected lifetime utilities of 10 Appendix B1 shows that e!ciency is also attained when the terms of trade are determined through generalized Nash bargaining.
9 buyers and sellers obey the following Bellman equations in continuous time:
where 7 ( &0' ! sup ' is the set of varieties that money holders are willing to buy. Equations (9) and (10) have similar interpretations to equations (1) and (3). The main di"erence is that the !rst term of the right-hand side of (10) is zero, because sellers do not get any bene!t from trading with buyers. This is a consequence of the take-it-or-leave-it o"ers that satisfy
Because buyers extract all the surplus from the match, and because the surplus of the seller does not depend on the quality of the match, the terms of trade do not depend on the taste index !.
The surplus of the buyer, !+(*)": * ': ) , is increasing in !. Consequently, the reservation property holds, and the set of acceptable varieties is 7 $ &!' ! sup ', where the reservation value
4%!"(#(*" 3 5or the divisible goods and indivisible money model7 a monetary equilibrium is a list (: ) ' : * ' !' *) that satis!es equations 9H;<912; and * 4 0.
Again, we compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with the allocation that a social planner would choose in order to maximize social welfare. Equations (9) and (10) imply that welfare equals
By maximizing < with respect to ! and * ! , we !nd that the !rst-best allocation satis!es
The !rst equation states that buyers of type # should consume all varieties of type # " 1. To explain the no-trade and too-much-trade ine!ciencies, consider a buyer's consumption decision when the seller produces a variety in a neighborhood of ! (see Figure 1 (a)). If ! $ !, the buyer is just indi"erent between consuming * units of the good and becoming a seller and remaining a buyer. The seller is also indi"erent between producing * units and becoming a buyer and remaining a seller. If ! is slightly below !, no trade takes place, because the bid price of money is smaller than the ask price of money.
11 In contrast, if ! is slightly above !, then the bid price of money is larger than its ask price and, because of the buyer-takes-all bargaining protocol, a trade takes place at the bid price. The consumed quantity, however, is ine!ciently large because of the buyer's low valuation of the variety.
In the indivisible goods model of Section 3.1, an increase of the in"ation rate increases the frequency of trades and welfare by lowering the reservation value !. In the divisible goods model of this subsection, this extensive e"ect of in"ation is also present. In contrast to the indivisible goods model, however, in"ation has also an intensive e"ect, i.e., an increase in the in"ation rate reduces the quantities exchanged in each match. In Figure 1 , if the in"ation rate increases, * is reduced (the intensive e"ect) and the reservation value ! moves to the left (the extensive e"ect).
Finally, we want to emphasize that none of these ine!ciencies are generated by the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o"ers by buyers. Rather, they are a general property of indivisible money models. 12 In particular, it will be shown below that the too-much-trade ine!ciency is not a consequence of the high bargaining power of buyers as the take-it-orleave-it-o"er might suggest. Indeed, with lotteries on money this ine!ciency vanishes even when the buyer has all the bargaining power.
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We now allow agents to use lotteries on money to determine the terms of trade. 13 We restrict our attention to take-it-or-leave-it o"ers (* ! ' $ ! ), where * ! is the amount of goods that the seller produces in an !-meeting and $ ! is the probability that the unit of money changes hands. Note that we do not need to introduce a reservation value for the taste index in this model, because if a buyer does not want to trade, he can propose $ ! $ 0.
With lotteries on money, the expected lifetime utilities of buyers and sellers satisfy
zero, because the take-it-or-leave-it o"ers satisfy
For a given realization of the taste index !, the buyer solves ma,
subject to (15) and
4%!"(#(*" E 5or the divisible goods and indivisible money model with lotteries on money7 a monetary equilibrium is a list (: ) ' : * ' * ! ' $ ! ) such that the value functions satisfy 913; and 914; taJing the lottery as givenL the lottery solves the maximiMation problem in 916; taJing the value functions as givenL and : ) ' : * 4 0.
As in the model without lotteries, e!ciency requires that
Pr*D*6(#(*" E Consider the model with divisible goods7 indivisible money7 and lotteries on money. Then7 there is a unique monetary equilibrium with ! ! 1 4 0 such thatD
The key result is that 0 ! * ! & * " ! for all ! 4 0. That is, the quantities exchanged are never larger than the e!cient quantities, and the frequency of trades is at its e!cient level.
This result suggests that the no-trade and the too-much-trade ine!ciencies are due to the indivisibility of money.
The results of Proposition 4 are displayed in Figure 1(b) . In the upper quadrant of Figure   1 (b), the dashed curve labelled * " ! plots e!cient quantities as a function of !, and the solid curve labelled * ! displays the quantities that are exchanged in equilibrium. If ! ! ! ! 1 , the two curves merge and the traders exchange e!cient quantities. The lower quadrant plots the probability that money changes hands, $ ! , as a function of the taste index.
With lotteries in"ation has only an intensive e"ect (
if µ increases, the "at part of the * ! curve shortens and ! ! 1 moves to the left. Notice that all trades are e!cient if 3 & 3 ! . If µ $ # $ 0, then 3 & 3 ! is satis!ed for 3 close to 0.
Thus, if the traders are patient and in"ation is low, they trade e!cient quantities in all meetings. In contrast, if µ is large, the too-little-trade ine!ciency does not vanish, even when 3 approaches zero (i.e., 3 ! is negative).
Pr*D*6(#(*" F The measure of trades where the quantities produced are ine!ciently low is smaller with lotteries than without7 that is7 ! ! 1 4 ! ! / . Moreover7 the value of money (: ) ' : * ) is higher when lotteries are allowed.
According to Proposition 5, lotteries reduce the set of matches where the quantities exchanged are ine!ciently low. The reason for this result is that money is more valuable with lotteries than without (i.e., : ) ' : * is larger), which implies that sellers are willing to produce more for it.
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In the indivisible money model, the frequency of trades is too low, because buyers are too choosy. In the divisible goods and indivisible money model, there are ine!ciencies associated with no trade, too little trade, and too much trade. What lies behind these ine!ciencies?
The analysis of lotteries in Section 3 has suggested that the reason for the no-trade and too-much-trade ine!ciencies is the indivisibility of money. To explore this conjecture further, we analyze the same mismatch problem in the divisible money and divisible goods model of Shi (1999) .
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Most of the description of the environment presented in Section 2 applies to the divisible money environment. The main di"erences are that time is discrete, and that each household consists of a continuum of members normalized to one who carry out di"erent tasks but regard the household's utility as the common objective. When carrying out these tasks, household members follow the strategy that has been given to them by their households.
At the end of each period, they pool their money holdings, which eliminates aggregate uncertainty for households. In the symmetric monetary equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings is degenerate across households. This facilitates the analysis, because we can focus on a representative household.
14 Finally, the utility of the household is de!ned as the sum of the utilities of its members.
15
14 The large household assumption, extending a similar one in Lucas (1990) , avoids di!culties that arise in models with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, and so allows for a tractable analysis of in"ation. In search models of money, it was !rst used by Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 Shi ( , 2001 . See also Berentsen and Rocheteau (2000, 2001) . Lagos and Wright (2001) investigate an alternative assumption that yields a degenerate distribution of money holdings in random-matching models of money. 15 We have also introduced the large household in the indivisible money and indivisible goods model of Household members are grouped into money holders (buyers) and producers (sellers).
Buyers attempt to exchange money for consumption goods, and sellers attempt to produce goods for money. The fraction of buyers is given by the exogenous constant 5. In each period, each household member meets at random a member from another household. Hence, the probability that a seller of type # meets a buyer of type # ' 1 is $5 , and the probability that a buyer of type # meets a seller of type # " 1 is $ (1 ' 5).
Although households di"er in their preferences and production opportunities, they all consume and produce the same quantities, so that each household can be treated symmetrically. In the following we refer to an arbitrary household as household %. Decision variables of this household are denoted by lowercase letters. Capital letters denote other households'
variables, which are taken as given by the representative household %. Because we focus on steady state equilibria, we omit the time index >. Nevertheless, variables corresponding to the next period are indexed by +1, and those corresponding to the previous period are indexed by '1.
The chronology of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of each period, household % has ? units of money, which it divides evenly among its buyers so that each buyer holds ?=5 units of money in a match. Within a period, no buyer can transfer money to another member of the same household. Then, the household speci!es the trading strategies for its members. After this, agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to the prescribed strategies. After trading, buyers consume the acquired goods, and sellers bring back their receipts of money. 16 At the end of a period, the household receives a lump-sum money transfer $ , which can be negative, and carries the stock ? "! to > " 1.
The quantity of money in the economy is assumed to grow at the gross growth rate %. We restrict % to be larger than the discount factor ". 17 The (indirect) marginal utility of money of the household % is & $ ": 0 (? "! ), where : (?) is the steady-state lifetime discounted utility of a household holding ? units of money.
As in the previous section, we assume that the terms of trade are determined through take-it-or-leave-it o"ers by buyers. When matched, household members observe the match type but cannot observe the marginal value of money of their trading partners. 18 As a consequence, households' strategies depend on the match type and on the distribution of their original models (a proof of this claim is available by request). 16 In contrast to Shi (1999) , we assume that at the beginning of each period the $ buyers are chosen at random among household's members and that each buyer consumes immediately the goods he has acquired in the market. 17 This condition guarantees the existence of a unique steady-state monetary equilibrium. 18 As in Shi (1999) , but in contrast to Rauch (2000) , buyers' strategies do not depend on the speci!c characteristics of the sellers they meet; rather they depend on the average characteristics of sellers. For a discussion of this assumption see .
potential bargaining partners' characteristics. In equilibrium, this distribution is degenerate:
all households have the same marginal value of money.
A buyer's take-it-or-leave-it o"er is a pair (* ! ' -! ), where * ! is the quantity of goods produced by the seller for -! units of money. If the seller accepts the o"er, the acquired money -! will add to his household's money balances at the beginning of the next period.
Because each seller is atomistic, the amount of money obtained by a seller is valued at the marginal utility of money, !.
19 The cost associated with this trade is * ! , and the seller accepts the o"er if -! ! " * ! . Thus, any optimal o"er satis!es
Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o"er (* ! ' -! ) satis!es
E92 @$% Dr*0r-A *+ #$% $*>6%$*8= For each period, the household chooses ? "! and the terms of trade (* ! ' -! ) for all ! $ &0' ! sup ' to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
subject to the constraints (18), (19), and
19 To see why, suppose that the measure of a member is µ. Then for the household, the value of & additional units of money received by a member is "
To express the value of & additional units of money for a member, we must multiply this quantity by the scale factor 1 $ . Because members are atomistic, we let µ + ! to get
Thus, from the point of view of the household &# is a member's indirect utility of receiving & units of money in a match.
16
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable ? and other households' choices. The !rst term between braces in (20) speci!es the consumption utility of the household de!ned as the sum of utilities of all its members (there is no aggregate uncertainty at the household level). The measure of buyers is 5, and the probability of meeting an appropriate seller is $ (1 ' 5) , so that the number of single-coincidence meetings involving a buyer in each period is $5(1 ' 5). Accordingly, aggregate utility is $5(1 ' 5)
The second term speci!es the household's disutility of production.
Equality (21) describes the law of motion of the household's money balances. The !rst term on the right-hand side speci!es the additional currency the household receives each period. The second term speci!es sellers' money receipts when selling goods, and the third term speci!es buyers' expenses when exchanging money for goods.
Denote by ' ! the multipliers associated with constraints (19). Note that these constraints are applicable only when buyers are involved in single-coincidence meetings, which occurs with probability $(1 ' 5). Note further that, according to (18), -! can be expressed as a function of * ! . The !rst-order conditions and the envelope condition are
Equation (22) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of consumption must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to acquire additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up ! ! units of money (see equation (18)). Increasing the monetary payment has two costs to the buyer. He gives up the future value of money &, and he faces a tighter constraint (19). Together, & and ' measure the marginal cost of obtaining a larger quantity of goods in exchange for money.
Equation (23) is the Kuhn-Tucker condition associated with the multiplier ' ! . Finally, equation (24) describes the evolution of the marginal value of money. It states that the marginal value of money today,
, equals the discounted marginal value of money tomorrow, &, plus the marginal bene!t of relaxing future cash constraints, One virtue of our model is that it makes the divisibility of money visible: for low-valued varieties buyers spend only a fraction of their money holdings to acquire an e!cient quantity of the good. In contrast, in Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 model buyers always spend their entire money holdings and they always exchange ine!ciently low quantities. Moreover, in our framework, in contrast to Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 model, the velocity of money depends on the growth rate of the money supply. In the Appendix A6 we show that the velocity of money is increasing in the rate of in"ation. This result arises, because in"ation reduces the real value of money (&6). Consequently, the buyers whose constraints on money holdings are not binding must spend a larger fraction of their money holdings to buy the e!cient quantity of goods.
Note also that with divisible money, in"ation has no positive "hot potato" e"ect on welfare, because it cannot increase the frequency of trades. In contrast, in"ation is always costly, because it generates a misallocation of resources.
21 A higher rate of the money supply increases the misallocation, because it reduces the set of meetings where agents produce and exchange e!cient quantities. To see this, note that in Figure 2 , the horizontal line $5 ( moves upwards when % decreases. Consequently, the fraction of ine!cient trades decreases. In the limit when % approaches ", almost all trades are e!cient, i.e., ! ! 4 approaches ! sup .
Note that the model can be reduced to the two following equations that determine * ! and & simultaneously:
Hence, the model has a very simple structure. Equation (25) states that a buyer consumes the e!cient quantity unless his money holdings are too small to compensate the seller for the production cost. Equation (26), which is derived from the envelope condition, can be interpreted as a standard asset pricing equation. For the household, the value of an additional unit of money received at the end of the previous period is & #! . In the current period, this 21 With search externalities a departure from the Friedman rule can be a second-best solution (Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2001) This similarity is revealed when comparing Propositions 4 and 6, corresponding respectively to Figures 1b and 2 . In both models, there is a threshold ! ! 6 , where % $ A' B, such that for all ! & ! ! 6 the quantities exchanged are socially e!cient, whereas for all ! 4 ! ! 6 the quantities produced are too low. Moreover, if ! 4 ! ! 4 (! 4 ! ! 1 ), buyers spend all their money holdings (they spend the indivisible unit of money with probability one). Also, if
buyers spend a fraction of their money holdings (they spend the indivisible unit of money with probability $ ! 1).
F 4(6'>66(*"
To explain further the ine!ciencies that arise when money is indivisible, and to discuss the role of lotteries to eliminate the too-much-trade and the no-trade ine!ciencies, we show graphically how lotteries (or divisible money) a"ect the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set and the outcome of the bargaining in the divisible goods model.
Consider a match where the taste index of the buyer is !. When bargaining, the buyer and the seller take : ) and : * as given. Let S ) (S * ) denote the surplus of the buyer (seller), and let S " $ S ) " S * be the total surplus of the match when the e!cient quantity * " ! is produced. Note that S " is the maximal total surplus that can be attained in this match, and that the S " S " line in Figure 3 represents the possible divisions of S " between the two players.
The Pareto frontiers of the bargaining sets without and with lotteries () / and ) 1 ) are represented by the solid curves in Figure 3 First, for all * ! 4 * " ! , a lottery moves the Pareto frontier upward, i.e., it allows agents to attain a higher total surplus. To see why, note that if * ! 4 * " ! , the marginal utility of the buyer is smaller than the marginal cost of the seller. Graphically, the absolute value of the slope of the Pareto frontier is less than one. This overproduction is a social waste, which is removed if we allow lotteries on money, because for all * ! 4 * " ! there is a lottery $ ! 1 such that the seller produces * " ! and still gets the same surplus as in the model without lottery. This new allocation increases the surplus of the buyer unambiguously. Consequently, lotteries on money permit traders to obtain a Pareto-superior outcome when * ! 4 * " ! . Note that the origin of the overproduction in the model without lotteries is that production transfers utility imperfectly. In contrast, when money is equally valued by the buyer and the seller, a lottery on money or divisible money transfer utility perfectly. Graphically, the fact that divisible money (or indivisible money with lotteries) transfers utility perfectly is illustrated by the partially linear Pareto frontier in Figure 3b , whereas in Figure 3a the Pareto frontier is strictly concave. Second, for all * ! ! * " ! , lotteries do not a"ect the Pareto frontier. In this case, the marginal utility of the buyer is larger than the marginal cost of the seller. Graphically, the absolute value of the slope of the Pareto frontier is larger than one. To correct this 23 In models where the marginal value of money is not equal for all agents, money cannot transfer utility perfectly (e.g., Berentsen (2000) , Rocheteau (2000) , and Zhou (1999) ).
too-little-trade ine!ciency, the buyer must be endowed with more money. Finally, note that increasing the value of money (: ) ' : * ) moves the point '* " ! " : ) ' : * to the right, which increases the set of points of the Pareto frontier in the model with lotteries () 1 ) that lie on the C " C " line. In Figure 4 we represent the bargaining solution without lotteries by a circle and the solution with lotteries by a dot when there is the too-much-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4a ), the too-little-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4b ), or the no-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4c ). For each case, under buyer-takes-all bargaining, the bargaining solution is at the point where the Pareto frontier crosses the vertical axes (S * $ 0). In Figure 4a , which is a redraw of 24 Recall that while bargaining the traders take the continuation payo"s ' B and ' S , and consequently the value of money (' B ' ' S ), as given. If we consider a general change in the bargaining protocol, the shape of the Pareto frontier would change too, because this would a"ect ' B ' ' S .
I J*"'8>6(*"
Divisible money enables us to distribute "value according to our varying requirements" (Stanley Jevons, 1875) . Despite the obvious advantage of having a divisible medium of exchange in real exchanges, in most search models money is an indivisible object. 25 The goal of this paper has been to evaluate the consequences of this assumption.
Our main conclusion is that the indivisibility of money generates the no-trade and the too-much-trade ine!ciencies. The reason why indivisible money generates these ine!ciencies is intuitive. First, if a buyer's valuation for a good is very low, then the ask price of money (the quantity that makes the buyer indi"erent between trading and not trading) is larger than the bid price of money (the quantity that makes the seller indi"erent). Consequently, no trade takes place even though it would be socially e!cient to trade. This no-trade ine!ciency disappears with divisible money (or with lotteries on indivisible money), because if a buyer's valuation for a good is low, he simply spends a small amount of divisible money (or he delivers the indivisible money with probability less than one) in exchange for a small
(and e!cient) amount of the good.
Second, if the buyer's valuation for the good is low but not too low, then the ask price of money is smaller than the bid price. Consequently, an exchange takes place. However, because of the buyer's low valuation for the good, the exchanged quantity is larger than the e!cient quantity (this is the too-much-trade ine!ciency). Like the no-trade ine!ciency, and for the same reason, the too-much-trade ine!ciency disappears with divisible money or with lotteries on indivisible money.
Finally, if the buyer's valuation for the good is large, we observe in all models the toolittle-trade ine!ciency. The cause of this is that the buyer is constrained by his money holdings. His constraint on money holdings is binding because the purchasing power of money is too low, in turn because agents discount future utilities.
From a methodological perspective, our paper shows that the model with divisible goods, indivisible money, and lotteries on money is qualitatively equivalent to the divisible goods and divisible money model. In either model, the quantities exchanged are e!cient for lowvaluation goods and are ine!ciently low for high-valuation goods. Furthermore, when the quantities exchanged are e!cient, the buyer only gives a fraction of his money holdings in the divisible money model, or he delivers his money unit with a probability less than one in the lottery model.
One conclusion of this paper is that an important condition for e!ciency in a monetary economy is that the medium of exchange transfers utility perfectly (the exchanged object 25 Exceptions are Green and Zhou (1998) , Molico (1996) , Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 .
23 must be equally valued by the two parties). In this sense, our analysis has complemented our paper on money and terms of trade (Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2000) , where we demonstrate that barter trades are generically ine!cient if the traders have asymmetric preferences for each others' goods. In such an environment, divisible money improves the allocation through its ability to transfer utility perfectly between agents.
APPENDIX A: Proofs
:19 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 1
Money is accepted by sellers if condition (4) is satis!ed, which requires from (2) that ! "
We will demonstrate that this condition is satis!ed if
is smaller than some threshold ! & .
@$% ("=(5(=>-8 '$*('% *+ !9 Equations (1), (2), and (3) implicitly de!ne a reaction function ! $ &(;):
By di"erentiating (27), we !nd
ing to (27), it satis!es
The left-hand side of (29) is strictly increasing in !, whereas the right-hand side is strictly de-
Therefore, ! & is unique. Moreover, according to (29),
According to (27),
From (30) and (31) we deduce that (see also Figure A1 ) Figure A1 .
Thus, condition (32) implies that:
, no monetary equilibrium exists.
(
, a monetary equilibrium exists. To see this, note that from (32), if ! & 4 2=,, (27) and (29) imply that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium with ; $ &(;) $ 2=,.
:29 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 2 @$% r%6%r5-#(*" 5-8>% !9 Inserting equation (7) into equation (8) yields !, ' 2 $ 0.
. @$% 8*##%r(%6 *" A*"%) $ ! 9 Equation (7) implies that
To derive $ use equations (5), (6), and (8), and integrate by parts to get
Replacing : ) ' : * by its expression given in (34) yields the expression for $ in Proposition 2.
@$% 5-8>% +>"'#(*"6 : ) -"= : * 9 Given !' $ ! , and : ) ' : * , the value functions : ) and : * are uniquely determined by (5) and (6). :39 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 3 &/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 Equations (9), (10), and (11) yield
From (12), (35), and integration by parts we have
The left-hand side of (36) is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing
For a given !, the equilibrium quantity of goods traded in a match is the unique value of * that solves (12). For a given (!' *), (: ) ' : * ) is entirely determined by (9) and (10). Hence, the monetary equilibrium is unique. Note that equations (12) and (36) imply that
! 0, and
Recall that the e!cient quantity * " ! is an increasing function of the taste index !. As a consequence, there is a threshold ! ! / for the taste index such that if ! 4 ! ! / , then * ! * " ! , and if ! ! ! ! / , then the opposite is true. The threshold ! ! / satis!es
Using the fact that !+(*) $ * and !+ 0 (* " ! ) $ 1' and the concavity of +(/), it can be veri!ed that * 4 * " ! and therefore ! ! / 4 !. Consequently, if ! ! !, no trade takes place; if ! $ &!' ! ! / ), the quantity exchanged is too high; and if ! 4 ! ! / , the quantity exchanged is too low. J*"=(#(*" +*r ! ! / ! ! sup 9 To determine the critical value 3 & , note that (12) and (36) yield
The left-hand side of (37) is increasing in *, whereas the right-hand side is decreasing in *.
The quantity 3 & is the value of 3 such that (38) is satis!ed with equality.
:E9 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" E @%rA6 *+ #r-=%9 Equality (15) and inequality (17) imply
Denote by ' ! the multiplier associated with this constraint, and rewrite the program (16) to get ma,
The !rst-order and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
Suppose, !rst, that inequality (17) is not binding (' ! $ 0). This implies that
@$% #$r%6$*8= ! ! 1 9 From the previous discussion we have $ ! $ min $ : ) ' : * , which can be rewritten as
If ! &/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 Equations (13), (14), (15), and (41) yield
where
Equation ( 
Denote by 3 ! the value of 3 that satis!es (43) with equality. Then
:F9 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" F
The thresholds ! ! 6 , % $ $E' A%, satisfy ! ! 6 + 0 (:
with lotteries than without. From (12) and (35), the equation that determines : ) ' : * in the model without lotteries is
With lotteries : ) ': * is determined by (42). From the fact that !+(* (42) is strictly larger than the RHS of (44). Consequently, : ) ' : * is strictly larger with lotteries than without. . Thus
@$% #$r%6$*8= ! ! 4 9 The threshold ! ! 4 is the smallest ! for which the constraint -! &
(
binds. Hence, ! ! 4 satis!es
, so that
&/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 The model has a recursive structure. For a given ! ! 4 , (46) determines &6. Given &6, (45) determines * ! . Given * ! , (18) determines -! and (22) determines ' ! . Furthermore, for a monetary equilibrium to exist, we must have & 4 0, which implies from (46) that ! ! 4 4 0. In the following, we will demonstrate that there exists a unique ! ! 4 4 0.
By substituting for ' ! its expression given in (22), equation (24) becomes
By multiplying each side of (47) by ! ! 4 , from (46), we have
In the steady state, the quantity &? is stationary. Therefore,
Integrating by parts, and taking into account that
in the steady state:
The left-hand side of (49) is strictly increasing in ! ! 4 , whereas the right-hand side is strictly
Consequently, there is a unique ! ! 4 $ (0' ! sup ) that satis!es (49). Finally, equation (49) implies that when % approaches ", ! ! 4 approaches ! sup .
K%8*'(#) *+ A*"%)9 The velocity of money is de!ned as the ratio of the money transfers in one period divided by the money supply, i.e.,
Proposition 6 and (18) imply that
can be rewritten as
where ! ! 4 is de!ned by (46). An increase in the rate of in"ation reduces 6!, and from (51) increases #.
:L9 P-r%#* +r*"#(%r *+ #$% 7-r0-("("0 6%# (" #$% ("=(5(6(78% A*"%)M =(5(6(78% 0**=6 A*=%8
We consider a meeting between a buyer and a seller, where the taste index of the buyer is !. Let S ) (S * ) denote the surplus of the buyer (seller) in the match. When bargaining, the buyer and the seller take : ) and : * , and accordingly the value of money (: ) ' : * ), as given.
N(#$*># 8*##%r(%69 Without lotteries, the surpluses satisfy
where * is the quantity produced by the seller for the buyer. The Pareto frontier is derived by solving the following maximization problem:
Because there is one variable to be chosen and one constraint, the value of * is directly given by (53). From (52) and (53), the equation for the Pareto frontier in the model without lotteries is given by
The Pareto frontier is downward sloping and strictly concave, and at S * $ : ) ' : * ' * " ! its slope is '1. At S * $ 0 the buyer's surplus equals S ) $ !+ (: ) ' : * ) ' (: ) ' : * ). This quantity can be negative if ! is low. In this case, there will be no trade.
N(#$ 8*##%r(%69 With lotteries, the surpluses satisfy
where $ is the probability that the indivisible unit of money changes hands.
The Pareto frontier is derived by solving the following maximization problem:
Assume !rst that an interior solution to this program exists. Then we have
and the equation for the Pareto frontier satis!es
where * " ! satis!es (57). Assume next that no interior solution exists. The constraint $ & 1 is binding i" the value of $ given by (58) is larger than 1 (i.e. S * " : ) ' : * ' * " ! ). Accordingly, the equation of the Pareto frontier is given by (54) . 31
APPENDIX B: Generalization of the terms of trade
In Appendix B we show that the claims we make in the text are also true for generalized Nash bargaining.
O19 <"=(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= ("=(5(6(78% A*"%) 3(#$ 8*##%r(%6
In this appendix, we show that lotteries on money remove the no-trade ine!ciency even when the terms of trade are determined by the generalized Nash solution. 26 We do not consider the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. We take as granted that : ) ' : * " 2, which is a necessary and su!cient condition for a monetary equilibrium.
Let ) $ (0' 1) be the buyers' bargaining power, and $ ! the probability that money changes hands in an !-meeting. The outcome of a negotiation between a buyer and a seller is a $ ! $ &0' 1' that maximizes the following Nash product:
@$% ("%!'(%"'(%6 (6%% Q(0>r% O2)9 According to (65), if : ) ' : * 4 0, then both ! 4 0 and * ! 4 0. Consequently, the no-trade ine!ciency remains. The concavity of the utility function implies that the too-much-trade ine!ciency is also always present. To see this, note !rst that equations (64) and (65) Figure B2 . Figure B3 .
O39 4(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= ("=(5(6(78% A*"%) 3(#$ 8*##%r(%6
We will show that with lotteries on money the only ine!ciency that remains is the too-littletrade ine!ciency. We will also show under which condition this ine!ciency vanishes.
@$% 7-r0-("("09 The terms of trade in an !-meeting maximize the Nash product:
First, a necessary condition for e!ciency is that ) 4 5. This implies that the too-littletrade ine!ciency does not vanish if the bargaining power of buyers is less than the fraction of buyers in the economy. Second, in the absence of in"ation (µ $ # $ 0) and if ) 4 5, the e!ciency condition is satis!ed for 3 close to zero. If agents become very patient and if the bargaining power of buyers is su!ciently high, then the too-little-trade ine!ciency vanishes.
OE9 4(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= =(5(6(78% A*"%) @$% 0-A%9 The terms of trades are determined through bargaining games with alternating o"ers (see Shi, 1999 Shi, , 2001 . 27 We consider the bargaining between agent % of household % and an agent ( from any other household. Each period is divided into an in!nite number of 27 See Section 4 for additional details of the bargaining protocol.
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subperiods of length $. If, in a given subperiod, it is agent %'s turn to make an o"er and agent ( rejects the o"er, in the following subperiod it is agent ('s turn to make a countero"er.
If an o"er by a buyer is refused, the negotiation breaks down with probability )$ () $ (0' 1)).
If an o"er by a seller is refused, the negotiation breaks down with probability (1 ' )) $. We will see that the parameter ) can be interpreted as the bargaining power of buyers. The possibility of an exogenous breakdown of the negotiation gives an incentive to traders to agree immediately.
In the alternating o"er game, o"ers and countero"ers converge to the same limiting proposal when $ goes to zero. Consequently, the !rst-mover advantage vanishes when $ goes to zero. 28 Because of this and because, as we will see, it facilitates the derivation of the envelope condition, we let members of household % make the !rst o"er in all meetings. In the symmetric equilibrium all households have the same characteristics. Consequently, the !rst o"ers of household % are always accepted. Moreover, because the length of time between two consecutive o"ers is in!nitesimal, these !rst o"ers are exactly equal to the countero"ers that household %'s bargaining partners make.
@$% *"%r69 The bargaining strategies are determined at the level of the household. We assume that these bargaining strategies depend on the speci!c taste index of the buyer in the match, !, but they do not depend on the speci!c level of money holdings or the speci!c marginal value of money of the buyer. Nonetheless, the bargaining strategies depends on the distribution of money holdings of the buyers and on the distribution of their marginal utilities of money. These two distributions, however, are degenerate in equilibrium. 29 Assume !rst that agent % of household % is the buyer, and that in a given subperiod it is his turn to make an o"er. The buyer, following the strategy given to him by household %, proposes that the seller produces * 7 ! units of output in exchange for -7 ! units of money if the quality of the match is !. There are two types of constraints that the buyer's household % must take into account. First, the proposed amount of money cannot exceed the buyer's money holdings, i.e., to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
: (?) $ ma, 
